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On Single-Input Controllable Linear Systems Under Periodic DoS
Jamming Attacks
Hamed Shisheh Foroush and Sonia Martı´nez
Abstract—In this paper, we study remotely-controlled
single-input controllable linear systems, subject to peri-
odic Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. We propose a control
strategy which can beat any partially identified jammer
by properly placing the closed-loop poles. This is proven
theoretically for systems of dimension 4 or less. Neverthe-
less, simulations show the practicality of this strategy for
systems up to order 5.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical systems consist of physical networked
systems which are controlled and monitored re-
motely [8]. Novel advances in communications and
sensing technologies have promoted the emergence of
these systems, which bears numerous advantages rang-
ing from ease of implementation to increased utility
in infrastructure facilities [17]. However, the potential
benefits of such systems may be overturned by several
challenges that include a higher exposure to external
attacks. This has motivated a renewed research effort
in the area of system security [9], [1], which attempts to
address system preservation issues.
In particular, the security of cyber-physical systems
can especially be threatened by communication-signal
jammers that are exogenous to the system. Common
attacks include Denial-of-Service (DoS) and Deceptive
attacks. In brief, a Deceptive attacker aims to change
parceled data, whereas a DoS one tries to corrupt the
transmitted data [31], [24]. According to [7], the most
likely type of attack is a DoS attack. These attacks
can be further categorized into periodic or Pulse-Width
Modulated (PWM) jammers motivated by ease of imple-
mentation, detection avoidance, and energy constraints
while; see the papers [19], [20], [10], [15]. Inspired
by this facts, this work focuses on the compensation
of PWM DoS jamming attacks whose periodicity has
already been detected.
The subject of security of cyber-physical systems is
receiving wide attention in the controls community. In
the context of multiagent systems, the works [27], [22],
[23], aim to identify malicious agents who are part
of the network in order to cancel their contribution.
The main goal of [6] and [5] is to maintain group
connectivity despite the presence of a malicious agent,
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thus identification is off the ground. The paper [32]
proposes a Receding Horizon Control methodology to
deal with a class of deceptive Replay attackers inducing
system delays in formation control missions. Our prob-
lem setup is related to these studies in the sense that
the jammer is assumed to be detected and we aim to
develop a method to overcome its effect.
In the framework of secure discrete LTI systems, [12]
considers deceptive attacks where the observation
channel is jammed. In [2], however, a DoS attack where
the attacker corrupts the channel while obeying an
Identically Independent Distributed (IID) assumption
is considered. Similar research is conducted in [26].
Game Theory is a natural framework to study system
security; some representative references include [16],
[29], and [25]. These papers model the security problem
as a (dynamic) zero-sum, non-cooperative game in
order to predict the behavior of the attacker. Inspired
by a leader-follower game-theoretic formulation, the
paper [33] employs reinforcement learning to beat a
deceptive attacker that can be modeled as a linear
map. In this framework, the closest reference to our
research is [16], which studies how the optimal control
of linear system remotely under a strategic, energy-
constrained DoS jammer. A main restriction of [16] is
the consideration of scalar dynamics, which makes the
presented analysis more tractable.
Motivated by the goal of maintaining “intelligent”
and economic communications, here we address the
problem of system resilience in the context of triggering
control, i.e., control actions triggered only when it is
necessary. This is inspired by recent work [28], [21],
[30]. The distinctive feature in our study is the fact that
communication is not always feasible.
We consider partially identified DoS attacks imposed
by PWM jammers, along with single-input LTI systems.
The current work follows upon [13], where we pro-
vide sufficient conditions on the jammer’s parameters
which, in conjunction with a given triggering law,
can ensure system stability. Despite the fact that it
covers a broad class of continuous LTI systems, the
previous strategy cannot cope with every given DoS
periodic jammer. The current manuscript solves this
issue by introducing a parameter-dependent control
strategy which can tackle any DoS periodic jammer.
Thus it ensures asymptotic stability under this class of
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Fig. 1. Problem Architecture
attacks, i.e., it renders the the system safe and secure.
The strategy is proven to work for a narrower class of
continuous LTI systems of order 4, or less, and, based
on simulations, we conjecture its validity for a large
class of higher-order systems as well.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
includes the problem formulation and notations. In
Section III, some preliminaries are provided, where we
propose a control design law to be employed later.
Then we go on to Section IV, where we discuss a
novel attack-resilient triggering law consistent with the
jammer signal. In Section V, we analyze and prove
the security of the system equipped with this control
design and triggering law. In Section VI, we demon-
strate the functionality of our theoretical results on
two academic examples. At last, in Section VII we
summarize the results and state the future work.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we state, both formally and informally,
the main problem analyzed in the paper.
We consider a remote operator-plant setup, where the
operator uses a control channel to send wirelessly a
control command to an unstable plant, see Figure 1.
We assume that the plant has no specific intelligence
and is only capable of updating the control based on
the data it receives. We also assume that the operator
knows the plant dynamics and is able to measure its
states at particular time-instants.1
More precisely, consider the following closed-loop dy-
namics:
x˙(t) = Ax(t) +Bu(t) , (1a)
u(t) = Kx(tk) , ∀t ∈ [tk, tk+1[ , (1b)
where x ∈ Rn is the state vector, u ∈ R is the input,
A, B and K are matrices of proper dimensions, and
{tk}k≥1 is a triggering time sequence. Here, we also
1This information can be obtained by using either local “passive”
sensors, e.g., camera network or positioning systems, e.g., GPS,
where no communication or cheap and safe communication is re-
quired.
assume that: (i) the system (1a) is open-loop unstable,
and (ii) the pair (A,B) is controllable.
We consider an energy-constrained, periodic jammer
whose signal can be represented as follows:
ujmd(t) =
{
1, (n− 1)T ≤ t ≤ (n− 1)T + Toff,
0, (n− 1)T + Toff ≤ t ≤ nT,
(2)
where n ∈ N is the period number, T ∈ R>0, and T =
[0, T ] is the action-period of the jammer. Also, Toff ∈
R>0, Toff < T , and Toff = [0, Toff] is the time-period
where it is sleeping, so communication is possible. We
further denote Ton ∈ R>0, and Ton = [Ton, T ] to be the
time-period where the jammer is active, thus no data
can be sent. Accordingly, it holds that Toff + Ton = T .
We also note that the parameter Toff need not be time-
invariant which recalls Pulse-Width Modulated (PWM)
jamming. Finally, we denote by T croff a uniform lower-
bound for Toff, i.e., T
cr
off ≤ Toff which we assume holds
for all the periods and we have identified as well.
In this paper, we assume that the type of jammer and
the period of the jamming signal has been identified.
Future work will be devoted to enlarge the triggering
time sequence for identification purposes.
Putting these pieces together, we study the following
problem:
[Problem formulation]: Consider any energy-
constrained, periodic jammer described by (2)
with parameters T and Toff. Knowing T and
T croff, a uniform lower bound on the jammer’s
sleeping periods, find a control strategy of the
form (1b) that is resilient to the action of this
jammer.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we recall some useful properties of the
systems that we study. These will be employed in the
subsequent analysis.
Since (A,B) is a controllable pair, the system (1a) can
be put into a controllable canonical form by a proper
similarity transformation [4]. Based on this fact, we
narrow our study down to the systems of this form:
x˙ =


0 1 0 · · · 0
0 0 1 · · · 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 · · · 1
−an −an−1 −an−2 · · · −a1

x+


0
0
...
0
1

u ,
u = [−kn + an,−kn−1 + an−1, · · · ,−k1 + a1]x . (3)
Recalling the pole-placement assignment techniques,
we obtain the folowing result:
Proposition 3.1: Consider λ ∈ R>0 and system (3). By
choosing:
ki =
(
n
i
)
λi, i ∈ {1, . . . , n} ,
all the closed-loop system poles are placed at −λ.
Proof: By plugging the proposed gains, Kλ =
[k1, . . . , kn], in the dynamics (3), the state matrix of the
closed-loop system becomes:
A+BKλ =

0 1 · · · 0
0 0 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · 1
−
(
n
n
)
λn −
(
n
n− 1
)
λn−1 · · · −nλ


.
Note that the characteristic polynomial of this matrix,
thanks to its specific structure, is given by [4]:
p(s) = sn+nλsn−1+· · ·+
(
n
n− 1
)
λn−1s+
(
n
n
)
λn .
Observe that the latter polynomial is indeed p(s) = (s+
λ)n. Recall also that the eigenvalues of the matrix A+
BKλ, i.e., the poles of the closed-loop system, are the
roots of p(s). Thus, we conclude that with this choice
of gains, all the closed-loop poles are placed at −λ.
The multiplicities of the eigenvalue −λ, described in
the previous result, are further characterized next:
Proposition 3.2: Consider the system (3) along with the
gains given in Proposition 3.1. The eigenvalue −λ of
the matrix A + BKλ has algebraic multiplicity n and
geometric multiplicity 1.
Proof: Since the characteristic polynomial of A +
BKλ is p(s) = (s+λ)
n, the algebraic multiplicity of −λ
is equal to n. The geometric multiplicity of −λ is equal
to the number of linearly independent eigenvectors of
A+BKλ associated to −λ; in other words, the nullity
of the matrix A+BKλ + λI . Further, it holds that [4]:
nullity(A+BKλ+λI) = n− rank(A+BKλ+λI) . (4)
By construction, rank(A + BKλ + λI) ≥ n − 1, as it
has n − 1 linearly independent columns. Also, since
−λ is an eigenvalue of A + BKλ, then it holds that
det(A+BKλ + λI) = 0, thus rank(A+BKλ + λI) < n,
From here, rank(A + BKλ + λI) = n − 1. According
to (4), we have that nullity(A + BKλ + λI) = 1, hence
the geometric multiplicity of −λ is 1.
Remark 3.3: Note that the matrix A + BKλ has only
one linearly independent eigenvector, therefore, it is
not diagonalizable. This property holds for all values
of λ ∈ R>0.
Furthermore, since the matrix A + BKλ + λI depends
on λ in a polynomial way, the components of this
eigenvector v are rational functions of λ. In fact, v can
be found as the solution to the following equation:
(A+BKλ + λI)v = 0 .
IV. JORDAN DECOMPOSITION AND TRIGGERING
STRATEGY
Our control strategy will consist of choosing an ap-
propriate Kλ as in Proposition 3.1 and an associated
triggering strategy {tk}k≥1. In this section, we study the
Jordan decomposition of the closed-loop system under
Kλ, and how to choose the corresponding {tk}k≥1.
From Proposition 3.1, the eigenvalues of the matrix A+
BKλ are at −λ. Thus, the Jordan decomposition of this
matrix can be expressed as:
A+BKλ = TλJλT
−1
λ , (5)
where Jλ = −λI+N and Tλ is a matrix built upon the
linearly independent and generalized eigenvectors. We
would like to remark the following:
• The matrix N has a unique structure for all values
of λ; this is because the geometric multiplicity of
this eigenvalue remains unchanged. Moreover, by
construction of Jordan decomposition, it does not
depend on this parameter,
• As discussed in the Remark 3.3, the only linearly
independent eigenvector of A + BKλ depends in
a rational way on λ. Then, by construction of the
generalized eigenvectors [11], they also rationally
depend on λ. Hence, the matrices Tλ and T
−1
λ , they
also depend on λ in a rational way.
Before presenting our triggering strategy, we introduce
a family of coordinate transformations used in this
paper. They are based on the Jordan decomposition of
previous paragraphs. Let us consider the system (3),
with the control u(t) = Kλx(tk). Then, the closed-loop
dynamics is:
x˙ = (A+BKλ)x+BKλe ,
where e(t) = x(tk) − x(t). Recalling (5), the latter dy-
namics under the static transformations e(t) = Tλeλ(t),
and x(t) = Tλxλ(t), yields:
x˙λ = Jλxλ + T
−1
λ BKλTλeλ . (6)
The following result states our first attempt in devel-
oping the triggering strategy.
Proposition 4.1: Take λ > ‖N‖+1/2 andKλ as in Propo-
sition 3.1. Then V (xλ) = x
T
λxλ is an ISS-Lyapunov
function for the system (6) and the event-triggering
condition:
|eλ(t)|2 ≤ σ(2λ− 1− 2‖N‖)‖T−1λ BKλTλ‖2
|xλ(t)|2 , (7)
guarantees the asymptotic stability of the system, for
σ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof: Let B¯λ , T
−1
λ BKλTλ, computing the time-
derivative of V (xλ), and plugging from dynamics (6),
we obtain:
V˙ = x˙Tλxλ + x
T
λ x˙λ =(Jλxλ + B¯λeλ)
Txλ+
xTλ (Jλxλ + B¯λeλ) .
After some simplification, we obtain:
V˙ = xTλ (J
T
λ + Jλ)xλ + e
T
λ B¯
T
λ xλ + x
T
λ B¯λeλ .
The latter can be further bounded recalling the follow-
ing inequality:
eTλ B¯
T
λ xλ + x
T
λ B¯λeλ ≤ xTλxλ + eTλ B¯Tλ B¯λeλ ,
which then yields:
V˙ ≤ xTλ (JTλ + Jλ + I)xλ + eTλ B¯Tλ B¯λeλ . (8)
Now, from our discussion on Jordan decomposition, it
holds that JTλ +Jλ = −2λI+NT +N . By plugging this
back into (8), we obtain:
V˙ ≤ xTλ (NT +N − (2λ− 1)I)xλ + eTλ B¯Tλ B¯λeλ .
We further upper-bound the latter equation, noting that
‖NT ‖ = ‖N‖:
V˙ ≤ −(2λ− 1− 2‖N‖)|xλ|2 + ‖B¯λ‖2|eλ|2 . (9)
Hence, for λ > ‖N‖ + 1/2, according to Equation (9),
and that V (xλ) = |xλ|2, ∀xλ, we conclude that V (xλ) =
xTλxλ is an ISS-Lyapunov function for the system (6).
Moreover, let σ ∈ (0, 1) and that the triggering time-
sequence be given when the following condition is
violated:
|eλ|2 ≤ σ(2λ− 1− 2‖N‖)‖B¯λ‖2
|xλ|2 ,
it then holds that:
V˙ ≤ −(1− σ)(2λ− 1− 2‖N‖)|xλ|2 .
Hence, the event-triggering condition, described by (7),
guarantees the asymptotic stability of the system.
Remark 4.2: Let tk and tk+1 be two consecutive time-
instants given by the triggering law (7). Then, for each
λ, the following holds:
∃τλ > 0, such that tk+1 − tk ≥ τλ, ∀k ∈ N .
This is based on Theorem III.1, presented in [28].
In other words, the time-sequence generated by the
triggering law (7) does not accumulate. This is an
important observation used in our analysis.
For the parameter τλ, we show the following property:
Theorem 4.3: Consider the parameter τλ introduced in
Remark 4.2. Then, the following holds:
lim
λ→∞
τλ = 0 . (10)
Proof: Recalling Remark 4.2, we first note that for
the parameter τλ it holds that τλ ≤ tk+1 − tk, ∀k ∈ N.
In particular, it holds that τλ ≤ t2 − t1. Let us, without
loss of generality, set t1 = 0, and denote tλ , t2. Then,
it holds that 0 ≤ τλ ≤ tλ. In this proof, we shall show
limλ→∞ tλ = 0, which implies that limλ→∞ τλ = 0. By
construction of the triggering law (7), the time-instant
tλ is when the following holds:
|eλ(tλ)| =
√
σ(2λ− 1− 2‖N‖)
‖T−1λ BKλTλ‖
|xλ(tλ)| . (11)
In the latter inequality and according to (5), it holds
that BKλ = TλJλT
−1
λ −A, that is:
T−1λ BKλTλ = Jλ − T−1λ ATλ .
Hence, according to this equation, (11) can be written
as follows:
|eλ(tλ)| =
√
σ(2λ− 1− 2‖N‖)
‖Jλ − T−1λ ATλ‖
|xλ(tλ)| .
Let us denote:
F (λ) ,
√
σ(2λ− 1− 2‖N‖)
‖Jλ − T−1λ ATλ‖
. (12)
We continue by presenting the following result:
Claim 4.4: The following holds:
lim
λ→∞
F (λ) = 0 . (13)
Proof of Claim 4.4: Recalling that Jλ = −λI + N ,
Equation (12) can be written as:
F (λ) =
√
σ(2λ− 1− 2‖N‖)
‖(−λI − T−1λ ATλ)− (−N)‖
,
where by applying the triangular-inequality of the form
|‖−λI−T−1λ ATλ‖−‖−N‖| ≤ ‖(−λI−T−1λ ATλ)−(−N)‖,
we obtain:
0 ≤ F (λ) ≤
√
σ(2λ− 1− 2‖N‖)
|‖ − λI − T−1λ ATλ‖ − ‖ −N‖|
.
Computing the asymptotic limit of the latter inequality,
noting that N is a constant matrix, and T−1λ Tλ = I ,
yields:
0 ≤ lim
λ→∞
F (λ) ≤ lim
λ→∞
√
2σλ
‖T−1λ (−λI −A)Tλ‖
.
On the other hand, for a matrix A¯ ∈ Rn×n it holds that
ρ(A¯) ≤ ‖A¯‖, where ρ(A¯) is the spectral radius of A¯; for
further insight, refer to [4]. Hence, the latter equation
can be further bounded as in the following:
0 ≤ lim
λ→∞
F (λ) ≤ lim
λ→∞
√
2σλ
ρ(T−1λ (λI +A)Tλ)
. (14)
Furthermore, recalling that T−1λ (λI +A)Tλ is the simi-
larity transformation of the matrix λI+A, it holds that
ρ(T−1λ (λI +A)Tλ) = ρ(λI +A). Accordingly, we get:
0 ≤ lim
λ→∞
F (λ) ≤ lim
λ→∞
√
2σλ
ρ(λI +A)
.
Now, by means of the Gersˇgorin disc theorem, we
obtain that:
ρ(λI +A) ∈ ∪ni=1D(λ + aii,
∑
j 6=i
|aij |) .
This implies that ρ(λI + A) has a linear growth as λ
tends to infinity. Therefore, without loss of generality,
we can write the equation (14) as follows:
0 ≤ lim
λ→∞
F (λ) ≤ lim
λ→∞
√
2σλ
λ+ c
, (15)
where c is some constant. Hence, based on (15), it is
easy to check that (13) holds, which completes the proof
of this claim. •
Having proved limλ→∞ F (λ) = 0, we would like to
show limλ→∞ tλ = 0, which then, by the squeeze
theorem, yields limλ→∞ τλ = 0. The next claim goes
along this direction.
Claim 4.5: The following holds:
lim
λ→∞
tλ = 0 . (16)
Proof of Claim 4.5: Recalling the triggering law and by
construction of tλ, the following holds:
|eλ(tλ)| = F (λ)xλ(tλ)| . (17)
On the other hand, recall that for t ∈ [0, tλ]:
eλ(t) = T
−1
λ e(t) = T
−1
λ (x(t) − x0) ,
that yields:
eλ(t) = xλ(t)− T−1λ x0 .
Applying the latter equation on (17) gives:
|xλ(tλ)− T−1λ x0| = F (λ)|xλ(tλ)| . (18)
In order to prove the result, we now consider two cases:
Case (i): |xλ(tλ)| = 0. In this case, by (18), it holds that
x0 = 0. Also since the system is linear and the chosen
control law of the form u = Kx0, the system does not
evolve. In other words there is no need for triggering,
tλ = 0 which renders τλ = 0.
Case (ii): |xλ(tλ)| 6= 0. In this case, dividing (18) by
|xλ(tλ)|, bestows:
F (λ) =
|xλ(tλ)− T−1λ x0|
|xλ(tλ)| .
Computing the absolute-value of the latter equation,
and applying the triangular inequality, yields the fol-
lowing result:
|F (λ)| = F (λ) =
∣∣∣∣ |xλ(tλ)− T−1λ x0||xλ(tλ)|
∣∣∣∣
≥
∣∣∣∣ |xλ(tλ)| − |T−1λ x0||xλ(tλ)|
∣∣∣∣ ≥ 0 .
Now, according to the Claim 4.4 and by the squeeze
theorem, we obtain:
lim
λ→∞
∣∣∣∣1− |T−1λ x0||xλ(tλ)|
∣∣∣∣ = 0⇒ limλ→∞ |xλ(0)||xλ(tλ)| = 1 . (19)
Now we will show that limλ→∞ tλ = 0 exploiting
a contradiction argument. Hence, let us assume that
limλ→∞ tλ 6= 0. Then, the negation of the mathematical
definition of limλ→∞ tλ = 0 implies:
∃t∗ such that ∀λ > 0, ∃λ¯ > λ such that tλ¯ > t∗ . (20)
In (20), let us take the sequence {λk}k∈N, where λk →
∞ as k → ∞, and set λ¯ ≡ λk. Then we have the
counterpart sequence {tλk}k∈N, for which we have that
tλk > t
∗. Because of this, we have that:
|xλk (tλk)| ≤ |xλk(t∗)| ,
which follows from V˙ (t) < 0 for t < tλk—by the choice
of our triggering law—and that V (t) = |xλk (t)|2. To
obtain a deeper insight, we refer the reader to the proof
of Theorem 5.1. Based on this observation, we derive
the following inequality:
lim
k→∞
|xλk(0)|
|xλk (t∗)|
≤ lim
k→∞
|xλk(0)|
|xλk(tλk)|
. (21)
Since t∗ < tλk , and by Equation (30), we obtain:
|xλk(t∗)| ≤ |xλk(0)| exp (−(1− σ)(2λk − 1− 2‖N‖)t∗/2) ,
which yields:
|xλk(0)|
|xλk(t∗)|
≥ exp ((1 − σ)(2λk − 1− 2‖N‖)t∗/2) . (22)
As σ ∈ (0, 1), by properly letting λk ≥ 1/2+ ‖N‖ go to
infinity, we obtain:
lim
k→∞
|xλk (0)|
|xλk(t∗)|
=∞,
which induces:
lim
k→∞
|xλk (0)|
|xλk (tλk)|
=∞ ,
from (21). From here we conclude that (22) is in
contradiction with (19). Therefore, it must be that
limλ→∞ tλ = 0.
Henceforth, we observe that for both Case (i) and
Case (ii), the Equation (16) holds, thus it completes the
proof of this claim. •
Finally, from the set of inequalities 0 ≤ τλ ≤ tλ, which
holds for all λ ∈ R>0, and by Claim 4.5 that shows that
limλ→∞ tλ = 0, we can conclude that limλ→∞ τλ = 0.
In this paper, we assume that the jammer is imposing a
“worst-case jamming scenario”, i.e., Toff = T
cr
off. Now, hav-
ing established the Proposition 4.1 and introduced the
parameter τλ in Remark 4.2, we define the triggering
strategy as follows.
Definition 4.6: The triggering strategy used in this pa-
per, despite presence of the jammer, is as follows:
t∗k,n ∈
{
lτλ
∣∣lτλ ∈ [(n− 1)T, (n− 1)T + T croff]}∪
{nT } . (23)
We note that based on Theorem 4.3, and for a given
T , we can find a λc so that the multiples of τλ lie
in the desired interval, i.e., the set introduced in (23)
is never empty. The triggering law introduced in our
recent paper [13] has inspired this strategy. The main
difference between both laws is the choice of triggering
times. While here we adapt the triggering sequence
via an appropriate choice of τλ that depends on the
jammer, in [13] we study when the time-sequence
generated by (7) is sufficient to beat a given jammer.
In (23), k ∈ N denotes the number of triggering times
occurring in the nth jammer action-period, and l ∈ N
stands for the multiples of τλ starting from l = 1 in the
first period and adding up afterwards.
V. STABILITY ANALYSIS OF THE TRIGGERING
STRATEGY
In this section, we shall present the main result of this
paper to guarantee the stability of the class of systems
considered under the given type of jamming attacks.
The following bound is found in [18]:
‖exp(M)‖ ≤ exp(µ(M)) , M ∈ Rn×n , (24)
where the µ operator is defined as follows:
µ(M) = max
{
µ |µ ∈ spec
(
M +MT
2
)}
. (25)
In the proof of next result and in order to avoid the sign
confusion, we shall use a variation of (25). Denote:
µM , |µ(M)|+ 1 . (26)
Then, the following holds:
‖exp(M)‖ ≤ exp(µM ) . (27)
Theorem 5.1: Consider the system (3) of order lesser
than 5, where (A,B) is a controllable pair. Given a
jammer signal (T croff, T ), then ∃λ∗ > ‖N‖ + 1/2, such
that ∀λ ≥ λ∗, the system with control gainKλ as chosen
in Proposition 3.1 and with triggering strategy (23), is
asymptotically stable.
Proof: We shall focus on the first jammer action-
period, i.e., 0 ≤ t ≤ T . For the sake of brevity, we drop
n = 1 in the t∗k,n annotation. Without loss of generality,
let t∗k = kτλ, for k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, be the time-sequence
generated by (23), where m is such that:
t∗m = mτλ ≤ T croff < t∗m+1 = (m+ 1)τλ .
We note that we can always assume this, since accord-
ing to the Theorem 4.3, we can make τλ arbitrarily
small by choosing λ large enough. As τλ > 0, the latter
equation yields:
m ≤ T
cr
off
τλ
< m+ 1 .
Thus, ⌊T croff
τλ
⌋ = m, where ⌊.⌋ is the floor operator, and
t∗m =
⌊
T croff
τλ
⌋
τλ . (28)
It is easy to see that for all a > 0, if ⌊a⌋ ≥ 1, then
⌊a⌋ ≥ a/2. Based on this observation, and as T croff
τλ
≥ 1,
then it holds that ⌊T croff
τλ
⌋ ≥ T croff
2τλ
, which by (28), gives:
t∗m =
⌊
T croff
τλ
⌋
τλ ≥
T croff
2
. (29)
The rest of the proof goes over the following steps:
1) We break the time-interval [0, T ] into two subin-
tervals [0, t∗m+1], and [t
∗
m+1, T ]; namely, when the
jammer is sleeping and active, respectively,
2) Then, in order to find an estimate for |x(t∗m+1)|,
and |x(T )|, we first transform the original system
into new coordinates by the matrix Tλ; we perform
some computations, and transform it back into its
original coordinates, by T−1λ — this is done for
each subinterval [0, t∗m+1], and [t
∗
m+1, T ]. This way,
the analysis becomes more tractable,
3) Finally, the theorem conclusion will follow by
studying a coefficient C(λ), appearing in |x(T )| <
C(λ)|x(0)|. Due to limλ→∞ C(λ) = 0, we will be
able to guarantee {|x(nT )|} is decreasing and use
a Lyapunov argument to prove stability.
Let us consider the transformed system (6). We observe
that for t ∈ [0, t∗m+1], and according to Remark 4.2, the
event (7) introduced in Proposition 4.1 holds, and that
also that V = xTλxλ = |xλ|2 is an ISS-Lyapunov func-
tion. Hence, resorting to the proof of this proposition,
the following inequality holds:
V˙ (xλ) ≤ − (1− σ)(2λ− 1− 2‖N‖)|xλ|2 =
− (1− σ)(2λ− 1− 2‖N‖)V (xλ), ∀t ∈ [0, t∗m+1] .
The latter equation, by the comparison principle,
yields:
V (xλ) ≤ V (xλ(0)) exp (−(1 − σ)(2λ− 1− 2‖N‖)t) .
which then, by recalling V = xTλxλ = |xλ|2, yields:
|xλ(t)| ≤ |xλ(0)| exp (−(1− σ)(2λ− 1− 2‖N‖)t/2) .
(30)
Now, we have to transform the latter equation into
original coordinates. First, by using x(t) = Tλxλ(t):
λmin((T
−1
λ )
T (T−1λ ))|x|2 ≤ |xλ|2 ≤ ‖T−1λ ‖2|x|2 . (31)
The latter equation is obtained noting that (i) |xλ|2 =
xT (T−1λ )
T (T−1λ )x, and (ii) the matrix (T
−1
λ )
T (T−1λ ) is a
positive-definite symmetric matrix.
According to (31), Equation (30) implies:
|x(t∗m)| ≤
‖T−1λ ‖ exp (−(1− σ)(2λ− 1− 2‖N‖)t∗m/2)√
λmin((T
−1
λ )
T (T−1λ ))
|x0| ,
(32)
which is computed for t = t∗m.
In addition, in an analogous way, this time considering
t ∈ [t∗m, t∗m+1], we can obtain the following result:
|x(t∗m+1)| ≤
‖T−1λ ‖ exp (−(1− σ)(2λ− 1− 2‖N‖)τλ/2)√
λmin((T
−1
λ )
T (T−1λ ))
×
|x(t∗m)| , (33)
where we note that τλ appears, as by our triggering
law, t∗m+1 − t∗m = τλ.
Let us consider the transformed system (6), once more.
We consider the time-interval [t∗m+1, T ], then eλ(t) =
xλ(t
∗
m)− xλ(t) and so an equivalent form of (6) can be
written as:
x˙λ = T
−1
λ ATλxλ + T
−1
λ BKλTλxλ(t
∗
m), ∀t ∈ [t∗m+1, T ] .
Solving this dynamics for the initial condition
xλ(t
∗
m+1), we obtain the following:
xλ(t) = exp ((t− t∗m+1)T−1λ ATλ)xλ(t∗m+1)+∫ t
t∗
m+1
exp ((t− s)T−1λ ATλ)T−1λ BKλTλxλ(t∗m)ds ,
(34)
which holds for t ∈ [t∗m+1, T ]. In order to further
simplify the latter equation, we use the fact that for
a given matrix A ∈ Rn×n, and invertible matrix T ∈
R
n×n, it holds: exp (T−1AT ) = T−1 exp (A)T .
Hence, Equation (34) is simplified as follows:
xλ(t) =T
−1
λ exp ((t− t∗m+1)A)Tλxλ(t∗m+1)+∫ t
t∗
m+1
T−1λ exp ((t− s)A)BKλTλxλ(t∗m)ds ,
which then results in the following equation:
Tλxλ(t) = exp ((t− t∗m+1)A)Tλxλ(t∗m+1)+∫ t
t∗
m+1
exp ((t− s)A)BKλTλxλ(t∗m)ds ,
and using x = Tλxλ to transform it back into the
original dynamics, yields:
x(t) = exp ((t− t∗m+1)A)x(t∗m+1)+∫ t
t∗
m+1
exp ((t− s)A)BKλx(t∗m)ds . (35)
We upper-bound (35), using (27), which results in the
following:
|x(t)| ≤|x(t∗m+1)| exp ((t− t∗m+1)µA)+
|x(t∗m)|‖BKλ‖
∫ t
t∗
m+1
exp ((t− s)µA)ds .
We evaluate the latter equation at t = T , and then solve
the integral to obtain:
|x(T )| ≤|x(t∗m+1)| exp ((T − t∗m+1)µA)+
|x(t∗m)|
‖BKλ‖
µA
(exp ((T − t∗m+1)µA)− 1) . (36)
Since T − T croff = T cron, and T croff < t∗m+1, we have that:
T − t∗m+1 < T cron .
Thus, we can rewrite (36) as:
|x(T )| ≤|x(t∗m+1)| exp (T cronµA)+
|x(t∗m)|
‖BKλ‖
µA
(exp (T cronµA)− 1) . (37)
Applying now Equation (33) on (37), we get:
|x(T )|
|x(t∗m)|
≤
(‖BKλ‖
µA
(exp (T cronµA)− 1)+
exp (−(1− σ)(2λ − 1− 2‖N‖)τλ/2)
‖T−1λ ‖−1
√
λmin((T
−1
λ )
T (T−1λ ))
exp (T cronµA)
)
.
(38)
Now, combining (32) and (38), we obtain:
|x(T )|
|x0| ≤

exp (−(1− σ)(2λ− 1− 2‖N‖)t∗m/2)
‖T−1λ ‖−1
√
λmin((T
−1
λ )
T (T−1λ ))

×
(‖BKλ‖
µA
(exp (T cronµA)− 1)+
exp (−(1− σ)(2λ − 1− 2‖N‖)τλ)
‖T−1λ ‖−1
√
λmin((T
−1
λ )
T (T−1λ ))
exp (T cronµA)
)
. (39)
To obtain the main equation, we shall use (29) to further
bound (39), which then results in:
|x(T )|
|x0| ≤

exp (−(1− σ)(2λ− 1− 2‖N‖)T croff/4)
‖T−1λ ‖−1
√
λmin((T
−1
λ )
T (T−1λ ))

×
(‖BKλ‖
µA
(exp (T cronµA)− 1)+
exp (−(1− σ)(2λ − 1− 2‖N‖)τλ)
‖T−1λ ‖−1
√
λmin((T
−1
λ )
T (T−1λ ))
exp (T cronµA)
)
,
C(λ) . (40)
We present now the following result on the coefficient
C(λ), introduced in the latter inequality.
Claim 5.2: In (40) following holds:
lim
λ→∞
C(λ) = 0 . (41)
Proof of Claim 5.2: In order to complete the proof, we
shall break C(λ)-expression as follows:
C(λ) = C1(λ)(C2(λ) + C3(λ)) ,
where:
C1(λ) =

exp (−(1− σ)(2λ− 1− 2‖N‖)T croff/4)
‖T−1λ ‖−1
√
λmin((T
−1
λ )
T (T−1λ ))

 ,
C2(λ) = (
‖BKλ‖
µA
(exp (T cronµA)− 1) ,
and
C3(λ) =
exp (−(1− σ)(2λ − 1− 2‖N‖)τλ)
‖T−1λ ‖−1
√
λmin((T
−1
λ )
T (T−1λ ))
exp (T cronµA) .
Then, we shall show that limλ→∞ C1(λ)C2(λ) = 0, and
limλ→∞ C1(λ)C3(λ) = 0.
According to (5), and recalling Jλ = −λI + N , we get
BKλ = −A + T−1λ (−λI + N)Tλ, which then results
in BKλ = −A − λI + T−1λ NTλ. Therefore, from this
matrix equality and applying the 2-norm operator on
both sides, we get ‖BKλ‖ = ‖ − (A + λI) + T−1λ NTλ‖,
applying triangular-inequality on the right-hand side,
we get ‖BKλ‖ ≤ ‖ − (A + λI)‖ + ‖T−1λ NT−1λ ‖, which
can be further upper-bounded as follows:
‖BKλ‖ ≤ ‖A‖+ |λ|+ ‖T−1λ ‖‖N‖‖Tλ‖ .
We shall employ this latter inequality, in order to obtain
a new upper-bound for C1(λ)C2(λ):
0 ≤C1(λ)C2(λ) ≤ C1(λ)×(‖A‖+ |λ|+ ‖T−1λ ‖‖N‖‖Tλ
µA
(exp (T cronµA)− 1)
)
.
(42)
Now, in order to show that limλ→∞ C1(λ)C2(λ) = 0, we
put together these two facts: (i) C1(λ) decays exponen-
tially, as λ→∞, since λ > ‖N‖+1/2, and σ ∈ (0, 1), (ii)
based on what we explained in Section IV, the matrices
Tλ, and T
−1
λ depend on λ in a rational way, so the val-
ues ‖Tλ‖, and ‖T−1λ ‖ depend on λ in a semi-algebraic
form [3], thus the dependency of the coefficient of C1(λ)
appearing in upper-bound of C1(λ)C2(λ) in (42) on λ
is of a semi-algebraic form, which is dominated by an
exponential dependency. Therefore, we can conclude
that the upper-bound of C1(λ)C2(λ) in (42), tends to
zero as λ → ∞. Henceforth, as the lower-bound of
C1(λ)C2(λ) is zero, then we conclude that:
lim
λ→∞
C1(λ)C2(λ) = 0 . (43)
In the following lines, we show that
limλ→∞ C1(λ)C3(λ) = 0. First, we note that 0 ≤ τλ ≤ T ,
and −(1− σ)(2λ− 1− 2‖N‖) ≤ 0, therefore, we get the
following bounds for C2(λ):
‖T−1λ ‖ exp (−(1− σ)(2λ− 1− 2‖N‖)T/2)√
λmin((T
−1
λ )
T (T−1λ ))
exp (T cronµA) ≤
C3(λ) ≤ ‖T
−1
λ ‖√
λmin((T
−1
λ )
T (T−1λ ))
exp (T cronµA) .
Also, C1(λ) > 0, ∀λ, hence we can multiply the latter
inequality by C1(λ):
‖T−1λ ‖ exp (−(1− σ)(2λ − 1− 2‖N‖)T/2)√
λmin((T
−1
λ )
T (T−1λ )) exp (−T cronµA)
C1(λ) ≤
C1(λ)C3(λ) ≤ ‖T
−1
λ ‖ exp (T cronµA)√
λmin((T
−1
λ )
T (T−1λ ))
C1(λ) . (44)
Then, we study the limit of upper- and lower-bounds
of (44). Let us plug C1(λ)-expression in the lower-
bound of (44), we obtain:
LBC1C3(λ) ,
‖T−1λ ‖2 exp (−(1 − σ)(2λ− 1− 2‖N‖)(T/2 + T croff/4))
λmin((T
−1
λ )
T (T−1λ ))
.
In order to show that limλ→∞ LBC1C3(λ) = 0, we recall
three facts: (i) Since σ ∈ (0, 1), λ > ‖N‖ + 1/2, then
there is an exponentially decaying term in LBC1C3(λ).
(ii) Recalling our discussion in Section IV, T−1λ depends
on λ in a semi-algebraic way, which is dominated by ex-
ponential decay. (iii) Once again, referring to Section IV,
the matrix (T−1λ )
T (T−1λ ) depends on λ in a rational way.
Hence, its characteristic polynomial depends on this
parameter in a rational way, moreover, we note that
this polynomial is of degree 4 or less, by assumption,
and due to Galois theory, the dependency of the roots
of this polynomial—including λmin((T
−1
λ )
T (T−1λ ))— on
λ is of semi-algebraic form, which is dominated by
exponential decay.
Having discussed the behavior at infinity of the lower-
bound of (44), we study the behavior of its upper-
bound at infinity. Let us plug the C1(λ) expression in
the upper-bound of (44). We then obtain:
UBC1C3(λ) ,
‖T−1λ ‖2 exp (−(1− σ)(2λ− 1− 2‖N‖)(T croff/4))
λmin((T
−1
λ )
T (T−1λ )) exp (−T cronµA)
.
Similar to LBC1C3(λ), it is easy to conclude that
limλ→∞UBC1C3(λ) = 0. In the previous paragraphs, we
have shown that the limit behavior as λ grows of the
lower- and upper-bound of (44) is 0. Hence, we infer
that:
lim
λ→∞
C1(λ)C3(λ) = 0 . (45)
Finally, having shown that the Equations (43), and (45),
hold, we have proven (41). This completes the proof of
this claim. •
At this stage, we have proven that in |x(T )| ≤ |x0|C(λ),
it holds that limλ→∞ C(λ) = 0. The main consequence
of this conclusion is that, based on the definition of
limit, the following holds:
given ǫ > 0, ∃λ∗, such that ∀λ ≥ λ∗ ⇒ |C(λ)| < ǫ , (46)
so, in other words, we can arbitrarily tune the decaying-
rate of the states via λ (and its effect on C(λ)). It
is, nonetheless, worth mentioning that in order to
paraphrase the asymptotic stability, the parameter ǫ
has to be chosen such that ǫ < 1, so that according
to (46), C(λ) < 1, and so V (T ) < V (0), which ensures
the asymptotic stability as demonstrated in Claim 4.3
in [13].
Remark 5.3: As stated in the statement of this theorem,
this is valid for systems of order 4, or less. An open
question is the investigation the classes of systems
of higher order for which the result still holds. In
particular, we have observed the validity of the result
for a system of order 5, and have presented the results
in the Section VI.
In the following remark, we shall discuss that the
results obtained so far are valid for an alternative
problem formulation:
Remark 5.4: We recall from the Section II that in the
current problem formulation, the jammer is corrupting
the control channel signal, whereas the observation
channel is safe. Indeed, we would like to point out
that the results presented in this paper—including
Theorem 5.1— are still valid under the other problem
formulation, i.e., the observation channel is also cor-
rupted by the same jammer. This is the case, because the
measurement data is required at the same time-instant
as the control is transmitted, which is successfully
available, since the observation channel is jammed by
the same jammer.
Remark 5.5: It is worth noting that our discussion in
the Remark 5.4 is no longer valid for our previous
results presented in [13], since therein the continuous
measurement of the states was necessary.
Remark 5.6: At last, let us call (i) “frequency of com-
munication” characterized by τλ, and (ii) “actuation
effort” characterized by λ and Kλ, the two resources
that the operator posesses in order to counteract the
jammer. We would like to emphasize that in the method
we are proposing, it is not feasible to decouple the
utility of these two resources. In better words, the
coupling between the utility of these resources yields
the main results presented thus far. We, nonetheless, do
not deny that an alternative approach may exist which
encompasses this decoupling idea and yields the same
assertion as in Theorem 5.1.
VI. SIMULATIONS
Having established the theoretical results of previous
sections, here we demonstrate the functionality of these
results on some representative academic examples.
A. Example 1: 3× 3 system
We consider the following system:
x˙ =

 0 1 00 0 1
−3 −2 3

x+

 00
1

u ,
u =
[
−
(
3
3
)
λ3 + 3,−
(
3
2
)
λ2 + 2,−3λ− 3
]
x .
The state matrix of the closed-loop system is of the
following form:
A+BKλ =

 0 1 00 0 1
−λ3 −3λ2 −3λ

 ,
where its only eigenvalue is −λ, which has algebraic
and geometric multiplicity of 3, and 1, respectively,
referring to Proposition 3.2. The only linearly inde-
pendent eigenvector is given by solving the equation
(A+BKλ + λI)v1 = 0 for v1, where we obtain:
v1 =

 1−λ
λ2

 .
In order to build the matrix Tλ (and T
−1
λ ), we need to
generate two other generalized eigenvectors, namely
v2, and v3. They are, respectively, the solutions to
(A + BKλ + λI)v2 = v1, and (A + BKλ + λI)v3 = v2
equations. After some algebraic manipulations, we get
the following result:
v2 =

 2λ−1
0

 , v3 =

 3λ2− 1
λ
0

 .
Hence, matrix Tλ is obtained as: Tλ = [v1, v2, v3].
Moreover, given the multiplicities of −λ, the matrix N
is as follows:
N =

 0 1 00 0 1
0 0 0

 .
In order to perform the simulation, we have to “tune”
some parameters related to the jammer and the trig-
gering policy. We have chosen σ = 0.1, jammer action-
period T = 1 sec, T cron, 1 = 0.9T , T
cr
off, 1 = 0.1T , and
T cron, 2 = 0.5T , T
cr
off, 2 = 0.5T . We note that the first
jammer is more malicious than the second one.
We use the procedure explained in Algorithm 1, to run
the simulation. The result is presented in Figure 3. In
Algorithm 1 C(λ)-Seeking
Input: Matrices: A, B, and N , Sequence: {λk}
N
′
k=1, Parame-
ters: σ, T croff, and T .
1: Given controllable pair (A,B), compute the proper sim-
ilarity transformation matrix, and find (Ac, Bc)—which
are in controllable canonical form,
2: for k = 1 to N ′ do
3: Numerically solve the following ODE, with φ(0) = 0:
φ˙ =‖A+BKλk‖+ (‖A+BKλk‖+ ‖BKλk‖)φ+
‖BKλk‖φ
2
,
4: Find τλk , such that φ(τλk) = σ,
5: Compute C(λk), as stated in equation (40).
6: end for
Output: Sequences {C(λk)}
N
′
k=1 and {τλk}
N
′
k=1 .
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Fig. 2. Third-order system: comparing 90% and 50% active jammers
order to get a deeper insight into the ODE introduced
in step 3 of this algorithm, refer to Corollary IV.1 in [28].
Referring to Figure 2, we can list the following remarks:
Remark 6.1: We acknowledge these facts: (i) the 90%
active jammer is more malicious than the 50% active
jammer, and (ii) to maintain the asymptotic stability,
we should at least guarantee C(λ) < 1. Hence, let us
define:
λ¯ = min
1≤k≤N ′
{λk|∀λ ≥ λk, C(λ) < 1} .
Then, we obtain λ¯90% = 1360, and λ¯50% = 210. Ac-
cordingly, we can induce that in order to guarantee the
asymptotic stability, larger poles (in the absolute sense)
are required in the case of 90% active jammer; this can
be interpreted as larger control effort.
Remark 6.2: According to the intricacy of the C(λ)
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equation; finding λ analytically, for a given value of
C(λ) is not feasible. As an alternative way, one can
use our proposed procedure, in order to numerically
achieve this goal. So, e.g., having obtained the sequence
{C(λk)}N ′k=1, for a given sequence {λk}N
′
k=1, one can then
obtain a polynomial or spline approximation for C(λ).
For this system, we have also conducted a study on
the evolution of the parameter τλ. This time, we picked
the sequence {λk = 0.01k}1000k=1 , and for each λk , we run
the procedure explained in Algorithm 1. The result is
presented in Figure 3.
The Figure 3 confirms our result in Theorem 4.3 on the
evolution of τλ.
B. Example 2: 5× 5 system
Our main result in this paper, Theorem 5.1, is stated
for the systems of order 4, or less. Nevertheless, this
is based on the general condition provided by Galois
Theory, leaving open the question of whether it holds
for subclasses of systems of higher order. We have
conducted a simulation study on a 5 × 5 system in
canonical form, and as it comes later, our result is yet
valid.
We consider the following system:
x˙ =


0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
−7 10 −3 4 −6

 x+


0
0
0
0
1

u ,
u =[−λ5 + 7,−5λ4 − 10,−10λ3 + 3,
− 10λ2 − 4,−5λ+ 6]x .
The state-matrix of the closed-loop system is of the
following form:
A+BKλ =


0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
−λ5 −5λ4 −10λ3 −10λ2 −5λ

 ,
where its only eigenvalue is −λ, which has algebraic
and geometric multiplicity of 5, and 1, respectively -
referring to Proposition 3.2. The only linearly inde-
pendent eigenvector is given by solving the equation
(A+BKλ + λI)v1 = 0 for v1, where we obtain:
v1 =


1
−λ
λ2
−λ3
λ4

 .
In an analogous way as in Subsection VI-A, we com-
pute the generalized eigenvectors:
v2 =


4
λ
−3
2λ
−λ2
0

 , v3 =


10
λ2
− 6
λ
3
−λ
0

 , v4 =


20
λ3
− 10
λ2
4
λ
−1
0

 ,
v5 =


35
λ4
− 15
λ3
5
λ2
− 1
λ
0

 .
Hence, matrix Tλ is obtained as: Tλ = [v1, v2, v3, v4, v5].
Moreover, given the multiplicities of −λ, the matrix N
is as follows:
N =


0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0

 .
We “tune” the parameters related to the jammer and
the triggering policy: σ = 0.1, jammer action-period
T = 1 sec, T cron, 1 = 0.9T , T
cr
off, 1 = 0.1T , and T
cr
on, 2 = 0.5T ,
T croff, 2 = 0.5T . We note that the first jammer is more
malicious than the second one. Then, we perform the
simulation running the procedure explained in Algo-
rithm 1, the result is shown in Figure 4.
Referring to Figure 4, we can list similar remarks, as in
Subsection VI-A. Furthermore, as promised before, in
both cases, it holds that limλ→∞ C(λ) = 0, which could
not be theoretically backed up.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have considered single-input, of
order 4 or less, continuous LTI systems, under peri-
odic PWM DoS jamming attacks. We have proposed
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a resilient control design law, along with a triggering
time-sequence to update the controller. In the main
result, we demonstrated that this control design and
triggering law is capable of counteracting the effect of
any jammer. In other words, we show that the system
is rendered asymptotically stable under our contri-
butions. The functionality of the theoretical studies
has been demonstrated in the simulation environment;
where we have also shown that the result holds for
a system of order 5, for which our theoretical result
cannot be stretched.
In this work, we have assumed that the jammer signal
has been previously detected and identified. We are
currently studying how to exploit signal processing
techniques to partly identify the jammer, that is to
identify the parameter T : the jammer’s period . More-
over, as the title stands for, in this paper we have
focused on single-input linear systems. In future work,
we will plan to study nonlinear and multi-input classes
of systems.
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